similar arguments. This is true whether the benefits are viewed as economic or as fitness benefits, which are sometimes identical but sometimes not (Rubin, 2000b) . Under either reading, some or most ethnic conflicts in today's world are likely harmful and counterproductive to the participants as well as to others. That is, ethnic conflict may not add to the expected wealth of the participants, and it might not increase their expected biological fitness and number of genes transferred to the next generation. Moreover, ethnic conflicts are not inevitable: even if humans have a taste or preference for such conflict, they can learn that this taste is counterproductive. That is, they can be shown that the relative price of engaging in this preference is too high and that the conflict will provide no benefits. In any event, there is some evidence that such tastes are rather weak.
When individuals have relatively more power over government -that is, when government ids democratic -then conflict of all sorts (including ethnic conflict) is greatly decreased relative to frequencies under other forms of government (Rummel, 1994) .
The level of ethnic conflict can clearly be reduced within a society. The U.S. is an example: this is a multiethnic society and, while there is some residual ethnic conflict and some small groups of racists still exist, by and large the level of ethnic conflict is quite small here. The level of such conflict has been greatly been diminished in a remarkably short (perhaps 50 year) time period, as dated from the Supreme Court decision outlawing school segregation.
3 Clearly evolution was not involved in this change; learning and changes in relative social prices were the driving forces. That is, discrimination once led to rewards and discriminators gained status or other benefits from their discrimination. Today, those who engage in this behavior lose status, and are punished in other ways.
Moreover, ethnic groups in the U.S. are much more diverse (much less genetically related) than groups in those countries where there is significant ethnic conflict. In Yugoslavia, for example, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims are all Slavs, and the differences between them are primarily religious, not ethnic or genetic; Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994 /1996 classify "Yugoslovian" as one genetic group. In the Middle East, Jews and
Arabs are all Semites; Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994 /1996 indicate that the Israelites 3 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) .
(ancestors of modern Jews) were originally one of many Semitic-speaking tribes.
Residents of Bengladesh are of the same group as some Indians and Pakistanis are more closely related to some Indians than are some other Indians (Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994 /1996 ; the difference between these groups is again religion. On the other hand, the U.S. has large groups of people of African descent, people of Germanic extraction (from Britain and Scandinavia as well as Germany), Mediterranean peoples (Italians, Greeks), Semites (Jews and Arabs), Asians (Indians, Chinese, Koreans), Slavs, and members of many other ethnic groups as well. This diversity is in part due to the greatly increased mobility of contemporary humans, as stressed by Goetze (1998) . If ethnic conflict were aimed at improving one's genes chances relative to other genes, the U.S. would be a much more fertile ground for such conflict than places where it actually occurs because there are many more unrelated individuals with whom to engage in conflict.
This is an example of a genetic preference responding to costs and benefits and perhaps to learning. In the U.S. there are benefits from ignoring ethnic differences and costs of taking them into account, and people learn about and respond to these benefits and costs. Indeed, we have gone from a society with official state sanctioned discrimination against blacks to a society with official pollicies such as affirmative action aimed at benefiting this minority and others. That is, the political process has gone from active discrimination against minorities to discrimination in their favor. 4 Thus, although there may be evolved preferences, we as humans are able to learn to change behavior if prices (broadly defined to include all costs and benefits of an action) change. This is an example of what Sober and Wilson (1998) call "facultative behavior" meaning adaptation of behavior to changes in the costs and benefits of this behavior. This is the essence of what is studied by economists. Indeed, I will argue below that there are often benefits almost everywhere from ignoring the ethnicity of people, and the puzzle is that some others have not realized these gains.
In what follows I first discuss one crucial difference between the EEA and the contemporary world: the EEA was likely very close to a zero-sum society (at least with respect to potential gains from trade between groups), and today there are actual lor is important because even students of human evolution may be misled on this point; an example is provided.
In addition to increasing gains from trade, there is another long term trend in ethnic conflict. That is the increasing size of entities treating themselves as ethnic groups. Van den Berghe (1981) indicates that who is included within a particular group is a variable subject to change, but he does not indicate that the secular trend is to include more and more subgroups in one ethnic group. For example, Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994 /1996 indicate that most European countries are heterogeneous and composed of many subgroups. This trend has been remarked upon by many, and is often viewed as a desirable moral outcome (e.g. J.Q. Wilson, 1993; Westermarck, 1932 , earlier made a similar point.) This increasing size of ethnic groups is an implication of Alexander's (1987) "balance of power" hypothesis: as technology allows increasing density of human populations, groups become larger in order to more effectively compete with neighboring groups. To the extent that this increase in size is due to the considerations discussed by
Alexander, hope that it will lead to all humanity viewing itself as one group is unlikely to be realized because there would be no competitive incentive to coalesce into one group.
On the other hand, increasing gains from trade and reduced gains from conquest may lead to reduced conflict without bound.
A ZERO-SUM SOCIETY?
There is one economic point that will be very important in understanding the evolved nature of political preferences. Today's world differs in crucial respects from the EEA. One major difference is that the EEA was largely a zero sum world, with competition of the sort that Hirshleifer (1998) calls "absolute competition." I argue that gains from trade even within a group were limited, except for sexual division of labor, which is universal among humans (Brown, 1991) . I then argue that there were also limited gains from trade between groups. I discuss some implications for the likely nature of evolved human attitudes.
Within Groups
Consider first the possibility of exchange within groups. At one time, our ancestors hunted and gathered, and the amount of food was approximately given. There was little if any production of food or other resources. In the EEA it is likely that there were very few "gains from trade," except for gender based exchange and intertemporal exchange aimed at reducing risk. That is, it is likely that resources were relatively fixed and there was little possibility of value increasing exchange or production, such as we see all around us today. We evolved in such an environment, and our minds evolved to adapt to it. The result is that humans in many cases now tend to base decisions on zero sum thinking when other forms of analysis would be useful.
It appears likely that there was relatively little division of labor evolutionary times. First, group sizes were relatively small, and as Adam Smith first indicated in 1776, "The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market." Before there can be a pin factory, there must be sufficient demand for pins to support it. Among small groups there was not enough room for substantial specialization and division of labor. If a social group is small, then a specialist will not be able to work full time at the specialty because the group will not be able to make use of the output of a full time specialist. The general point is made by Maynard Smith and Szathm↔ry (1999, p. Ridley (1996) believes that division of labor and specialization was common in the EEA. In discussing his vision of the division of labor, Ridley (1996, p. 49) That is, while there may have been some limited amount of specialization, it would have been incomplete. The hunter who knew how to find game would have thrown spears at it as well and the spear thrower might have engaged in butchering if his spear hit. Sahlins (1972) argues that the division of labor and specialization was limited in primitive societies of the sort that are relevant for analysis of the EEA. "…for every man can and does make the things that men make and every woman the things that women make." (Sahlins, p. 9, favorably quoting Marshall, 1961 .) While Sahlins work is controversial, it appears that this particular point has not been debated. For example Bird-David (1992) , in a paper commenting on Sahlins, discusses the simple nature of the tools used in such societies, with the implication that specialized toolmakers did not exist.
Moreover, exchange would have been difficult, and so again limited. Economists stress that in non-monetary societies, barter would have been necessary for exchange.
Barter is limited by the requirement for a "double coincidence of wants" -that is, each party to a potential exchange must have exactly what the other party desires for exchange to occur. Reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971 ) extends this possibility somewhat, by allowing intertemporal exchange, but the amount of non-simultaneous exchange is limited by the possibility of cheating. That is, if one hunter shares his game today, he must be certain that the beneficiary will share his when situations are reversed, but it is difficult to guarantee this in a world with no contract enforcement. The biological notion of reciprocal altruism is a mechanism that will alleviate this problem by mechanisms identified by Trivers, such as moralistic anger in response to cheating. But these mechanisms will not fully solve this problem. This limited amount of exchange is consistent with the conclusion of Stiner et al. (1998) that "Low human population densities during most of the Middle Paleolithic imply that group sizes and social networks were small, which certainly limited the numeric scope of individual interactions. Under these conditions the possibilities for evolution of complex sharing and exchange behavior as ways to counter the effects of unpredictable resource supplies would have also been quite limited." This suggests that even the insurance function of exchange (as discussed by Knauft, 1991) was limited.
Between Groups
If exchange within a group was of limited benefit, then exchange between groups would also have been of limited value. First, in a world with relatively little production, resources would of necessity have been limited and amounts could not have been increased. If one group killed an elephant, then that elephant was not available for another group to kill. If one tribe gathered in a certain area, then other tribes had to go elsewhere. Second, exchange between groups would have been even more difficult than exchange within a group. As mentioned above, barter requires that both parties simultaneously have something that the other party wants, or that there be some enforcement mechanism to mandate repayment. Such enforcement mechanisms (including the moralistic aggression that enforces reciprocal altruism) would have had much weaker force between group than within groups. Thus, exchange between groups would have been of limited value in the EEA. Humans evolved in this environment, and it would have paid for them to evolve xenophobic and nepotistic attitudes.
Over time, group size did expand, and small groups coalesced into larger entities (e.g., Wiessner, 1998) . There were benefits of such larger agglomerations, in terms of possibilities for exchange (of spouses and goods) and also for more effective conflict with agglomerated neighboring groups, an implication of Alexander's (1987) "balance of power" competition. However, this fusion could not occur until technologies able to support large densities were available. Humans and our ancestors spent much time in the small bands discussed by Stiner et al. (1998) before coming together into larger bands.
These larger bands then adopted mechanisms borrowed from smaller family sized groups to generate loyalty within the larger group (Wiessner, 1998; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1998 But before this, there was relatively little exchange; Gamble (1999) indicates that in the Late Middle Paleolithic most transfers of materials were relatively local.
In a zero sum world of the sort that existed in the EEA, conflict between tribes could be useful for the victors, both as a group and individually. There is no need of group selection arguments to explain such conflict. First, if one tribe (band) could defeat another, then the victorious combatants would have access to the resources commanded by the second tribe. Second, a common pattern in the EEA was the taking of the females of defeated enemies. Both of these gains -resources and females -could be translated into fitness, and so those who engaged in this behavior would have benefited and would have left more genes in the human gene pool. Thus, in the EEA such conflict could have been individually desirable with respect to fitness, and we are descended from those who gained from such conflict.
Once preferences for conflict with our neighbors evolved (and they probably date back to our ape-like ancestors: chimpanzees engage in something very like war and genocide; e.g., Wrangham and Peterson, 1996) then they would have been selfreinforcing. If I will attack members of the neighboring tribe on sight, then they will learn to attack me first. If I can identify them by dress or accent or tattoos then these should become useful markers for friendship and enmity. 5 But this does not mean that such conflict is desirable today, even if observed from the viewpoint of the combatants, or even the victors.
Evolved Attitudes
The result is that we evolved in a world with limited possibilities of gains from trade or exchange, and limited possibilities of activities that would increase personal or social wealth. Therefore, our minds are built for understanding a zero sum society. (See also Rubin (2000a) , for some other implications of this analysis.) Economics stresses the possibilities of gains from trade -it is possible for both parties to come out ahead from exchange. Indeed, this is what runs a modern economy. But this is a very counterintuitive notion for most people. (This should not be interpreted as arguing that people cannot understand the notion, but rather that it must be taught.)
Indeed, even when people do engage in mutually beneficial trade, they are not motivated by this mutual benefit. Rather, each aims at maximizing his or her own benefits. The fact that for trade to occur, both must benefit is irrelevant for each individual. To quote Adam Smith again, "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." Thus, there is no reason to expect that an innate mental module to measure gains from trade has evolved. Rather, we are each selected to try to be sure that we gain from trade; gains to our trading partner are irrelevant. Moreover, there are mental mechanisms that work against this recognition of mutual benefit. Even in mutually beneficial trades, there is also an aspect of competition. Both sides want to engross for themselves as much as possible of the gains. That is, buyers want the price to be low, and sellers want it to be high. Therefore, in engaging in trade, an important consideration is to avoid being victimized. As a result, mental modules aimed at policing transactions have evolved . These modules focus on the "zero-sum" aspect of trade (Wright, 1999) -that aspect dealing with the terms of the bargain, rather than with the gains.
There may be another difference between conflict and trade. To engage in conflict (at least at the group or tribal level) a conscious policy decision must be made.
various disputants in the former Yugoslavia) are close relatives compared with the entire range of mankind and cannot be differentiated by skin color.
Many persons must be consulted, and pros and cons debated. On the other hand, individuals automatically engage in mutually advantageous trade. This might mean that we must think more consciously about gains or losses from conflict, while we can simply engage in trade without any conscious thought, and especially without any thought of the mutual benefits.
I do not want to be read as implying that trade is artificial or that people must be taught to engage in exchange. As an economist, I believe that trade is of fundamental importance to humans; Adam Smith discussed "the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another." People engage in mutually profitable exchange when it is possible, and they do so automatically But for reasons discussed above, I do believe that people do not have an innate understanding of the benefits of such exchange.
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This lack of understanding may apply particularly to international trade -trade between countries or, more relevant for the analysis here, between ethnic groups. This is because in addition to the normal views of trade, international trade also implicates our xenophobic modules. Krugman (1996) has pointed out the fallacies in many highly popular arguments against such trade; the relevant point for the analysis here is that the anti-trade arguments were highly popular and presented in well selling books. Such arguments are also popular politically. While the U.S. now has relatively small tariffs and other barriers to international trade, there was a struggle to reduce these levels, and there is is a continual struggle to maintain these low levels, in part because people do not fully understand that trade is mutually beneficial.
INEFFICIENCY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT TODAY
There are at least three reasons why ethnic conflict is not likely to be useful for combatants improving in today's world. First and most importantly, the modern world is not zero sum. Rather, there are possible gains from trade in many dimensions. Ethnic conflict reduces the possibility of these gains, and thus harms the combatants; see also Hirshleifer, 1998 . Second, for most of the world, the issues that may be involved in ethnic conflict are not the goals of combatants. Third, in many cases the rest of the world punishes groups for engaging in ethnic combat, so that the net result is not a gain. I discuss each point. 6 If they did, the teaching of economics would be much simpler.
Gains from Trade
The main reason why ethnic conflict does not pay is because of potential gains from trade that are eliminated by this conflict. These gains come from two sources.
First, if members of ethnic groups have similar skills and abilities, then there are benefits from simply expanding the size of the market. Second, if members of different ethnic groups have different skills and abilities for any reason, 7 then there are gains from trade. Polachek (1992) has shown that in the case of countries, increased trade and increased gains from trade are associated with significantly reduced levels of conflict, and that the direction of causation is from trade to conflict reduction.
Consider first the size of the market. Remember that "the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market." This means that as the number of people in a market expands, it is possible for each worker to specialize in a narrower area of production. As this happens, productivity (real wealth) increases. More people in a market also create the possibility for more specialized consumption opportunities. It is also true that the existence of more people leads to a greater possibility for technological advance, as
shown by Julian Simon (1981 Simon ( /1996 , Michael Kremer (1993) , and Charles Jones (1999).
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Of course, additional people can be from the same ethnic group, but if population growth has slowed or become negative, as is true for much of the developed world, then the only way to realize these gains is to allow members of different ethnic groups to join the society.
The second type of gain from trade occurs if the members of different ethnic groups have different skills and abilities. In that case, there are possibilities of members of each group specializing in different activities, and then engaging in mutually beneficial trade. Of course, in this circumstance, those particular members of the dominant group who compete most closely with members of the smaller group would have incentives to reduce this trade, perhaps by generating ethnic conflict, but members of the society overall will benefit from the increased trade.
7 It is not necessary to consider the source of such differences, only their existence. 8 This is not to say that at some point incomes may fall as population increases. However, there is no evidence that we have reached such a point. Jones (1999) estimates that the number of new ideas generated per year has increased by a factor of 108 from 25,000 BC to today as a result of population growth. Spillovers and better property rights have also caused massive increases in new ideas.
To make this point more carefully, I will consider Jews as an ethnic group. Jews have been a minority ethnic group in many societies and have been persecuted in many of these societies. Moreover, a recent series of books by an evolutionary minded scholar, Kevin MacDonald 9 , has analyzed anti-Semitism from an evolutionary perspective, but has missed the key point about increased gains from trade. Therefore, examination of this ethnic group will provide a useful demonstration of the general point. The general assumption is that Jews will live in a society as a minority, where the ethnic majority is from another background. Of course, this point would apply to any minority ethnic group; I merely use Jews as a convenient example.
MacDonald argues that anti-Semitism is caused ultimately by "resource competition and conflicts of interest" between Jews and gentiles living in he same society. The key point that is largely missed or ignored is that this "resource competition" will generally provide economic benefits to gentile society overall, even if it does harm some segments of gentile society. (1956/1971) , uses this model in discussing black-white discrimination, and reaches the same conclusion: both groups benefit from exchange.)
Those parties in direct competition with Jews, such as gentile merchants in competition with Jewish merchants, might lose from this competition, just as some American firms and workers lose from international competition with other countries.
But the broader point is that the gains to those who gain from exchange (the customers of the Jewish merchants, or the clients of the Jewish moneylenders) gain more than the losers (non-Jewish merchants or moneylenders) lose, so that overall there are net gains to gentile society from free trade. This is a standard argument in analyzing trade: American (or, more generally, domestic) consumers gain more from international trade than competing American (domestic) producers lose. This is the standard economic argument in favor of free trade, dating back to David Ricardo; for a modern discussion, see Krugman (1996) . Maghribi traders, see Greif (1993) . Greif indicates that these traders lost their markets when the Italian merchants became more efficient.
volume that deals with economic relations between Jews and gentiles. 10 I have worked as an economist in numerous antitrust matters, and have personally seen no evidence that Jews in business compete any less vigorously against other Jews than against gentiles, or than gentiles compete against gentiles. Indeed, one well known paper argued that discrimination against Jews in medical school admissions was to avoid the fact that Jews were well known as highly competitive in pricing: Kessel, 1958. Take the stronger case. Assume that gentiles are forbidden from engaging in money lending, perhaps by religious prohibitions, so that there is no potential competition for Jewish moneylenders. (This position is actually false: Barzel, 1992 , indicates that the Jewish moneylenders in England lost their market to the Italians in the 13 th century.)
Assume for the sake or argument that all Jewish moneylenders collude and charge the monopoly price, although this is highly unlikely. Nonetheless, even under these extreme and highly unlikely conditions, gentile borrowers will still benefit relative to the situation with no moneylenders. That is, dealing with a monopolist is better than having no opportunity to trade at all. The "terms of trade" for dealing with a monopolist are worse than the terms of trade in dealing with a competitive firm, but still some voluntary trade is better than none. However, the period following the imposition of restrictions on Jews discussed by MacDonald is sometimes called the "Dark Ages," indicating that it may be characterized by relatively little intellectual advance. With respect to the Nazis, it is interesting to note that the American nuclear bomb was produced in part with inputs from many Jewish scientists who left Germany and other European countries in fear of the Nazis. Without Nazi anti-Semitism some of these scientists might have worked on the German war effort. Thus, it is at least plausible that anti-Semitism has had the negative effects on the gentile community that economic theory would suggest.
Jews would also be harmed by separatism, and the harm to Jews would be greater than the harm to gentiles. This is because there are fewer Jews and so the loss of trade opportunities with gentiles will harm the Jewish community more than the loss of trade opportunities with Jews will harm gentiles. Self-sufficiency is more expensive for a smaller group.
It might appear that economic arguments are irrelevant in an analysis of fitness.
Fitness is often defined in relative terms, and economics deals with absolute incomes. Conflict between neighbors was an important fact during human evolution;
indeed, some think that it this conflict was one of the major inputs into human evolution and in particular the evolution of human intelligence (e.g., Alexander, 1987) . However, exchange is also important and there are gains from exchange. It is a common error to view exchange in competitive terms; discussion of "trade wars" is a staple of the popular press, and of politics. This is an example of the sort of zero sum thinking discussed above. The implicit notion is that there is only a certain amount of money to spend, and that if it is spent with foreigners it is not spent with domestic firms. But one of the most basic lessons of economics is that this notion is false (e.g., Krugman, 1996) .
Nonetheless, it may be a notion that we are selected to believe unless taught otherwise. Rubin (2000b) discusses in more detail the nature of evolved political preferences.
Thus, ethnic groups today can be viewed as playing a variant of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. One strategy is to cooperate and engage in mutually profitable trade.
The other strategy is to attack one's neighbor and expropriate his wealth. The "folk theorem" of game theory tells us that cooperative solutions are possible in such games; Axelrod (1984) has shown that one such solution, "tit for tat" is a successful strategy in many environments. Goetze (1998) also discusses the benefits of increased interaction between groups, which he calls functional benefits. Those groups that avoid conflict are the ones that can choose the cooperative strategy; groups engaging in conflict choose the attack strategy. There may be some inherited tendency to choose the latter strategy if tastes have evolved in a zero sum environment. Nonetheless, most potential adversaries seem to be able to choose the cooperative strategy. Those with an interest in reducing the level of ethnic conflict might attempt to determine why one strategy rather than the other is chosen. This avenue to conflict reduction is more likely to be successful than an approach based on increasing the size of in-groups, if the latter are a result of balance of power competition. This is especially true if there are few benefits from the attack strategy, as discussed next.
Gains from Conflict
In today's world, ethnic conflict is not likely to provide net gains, perhaps even to the victor. Gains must be defined. In biological terms, we think of gains in terms of fitness. Economists are more likely to think of utility maximization. These may not be so different; utility functions presumably evolved, and we obtain utility from those things that were associated with fitness in the evolutionary environment. Wealth is also closely related to utility, although not identical. In any event, no matter what the maximand, it is unlikely that ethnic conflict will in general in today's world achieve any goal.
Consider fitness. The issues that are relevant in ethnic conflict are not related to fitness for most people. In the EEA, conflicts were over land or territory, and land was a major input into survival and thus into reproduction. 14 This is not to say that it was a conscious goal in the past, although for many it may have been: Betzig, 1986. Europe, population growth is actually below replacement levels, and this is not due to wealth constraints. In China, draconian population policies are aimed at reducing the number of people in the country. As other countries become wealthier, we may expect similar patterns. The constraint on the number of children is parental desires or social policy, not any economic limit. Policies that would have led to increased fitness or reproductive success in the EEA will not have that effect today. Thus, again, land is valued for its economic value, not for its ability to grow crops to increase fitness.
Capturing of land would not in general be a wealth maximizing strategy in the developed world. Much of the value of land comes from minerals or petroleum, which can be captured through conquest. 15 But much comes from the organization of production. The value of real estate in New York City, Tokyo, and Hong Kong does not come from the crops that can be grown or because of the minerals under the land.
Rather, they are valuable because of the buildings and, more importantly, because of the human capital in the workers in the buildings that is agglomerated in the cities. An invading army conquering one of these cities would not be able to appropriate the wealth that they create by taking over the land. The buildings without the workers would have little if any value. Rather, to benefit, a conqueror would be forced to allow the existing population to continue working. Any benefit to the conqueror would come from taxes, as in the case of China and Hong Kong. This is very different from massacring the men and kidnapping and raping the women, the standard form of ethnic conflict in the EEA, and among chimpanzees.
If humans gain utility directly from attacking those who are ethnically different, then by definition such attacks would be utility increasing. But it is unlikely that this is so as a general matter. In certain circumstances, there may be evolved mechanisms that lead to hostility and conflict. These mechanisms have evolved to adapt to recurrent situations in the EEA associated with ethnic conflict. They may involve defense from ethnically different attackers, or they may involve attacks on those who are ethnically different in circumstances where such attacks would have been likely to succeed. Such mechanisms are likely to be domain specific (Barkow et al., 1992) . But in any case, it 15 The recent Gulf War may have been aimed at eliminating the power of Iraq to obtain a monopoly position with respect to petroleum.
appears obvious that some learning is involved; most of us in the U.S. have learned not to engage in such attacks, or to anticipate utility from them. While humans can be indoctrinated to find such aggression desirable (Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Salter, 1998) absent such indoctrination, we are unlikely to spontaneously engage in this behavior. More generally, there is evidence that more democratic governments -in which individuals have more power -are much less likely to engage in either internal or external conflict than are more authoritative governments (Rummel, 1994) . If humans had strong tastes for such conflict (as opposed to having the ability to be indoctrinated to engage in conflict) we would expect democracies to disproportionately engage in hostilities. The fact that they do not is evidence for the weakness of whatever preferences may exist.
Punishment
In many cases, the world punishes those who engage in ethnic conflict. This punishment is not certain, and does not always occur. But it is probably common enough so that it reduces the already small return from ethnic persecution or conflict. For one example, a worldwide boycott of South Africa ultimately caused the ethnically based apartheid regime to collapse. For another, the Serbian policy of "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo was quite costly to the Serbs as a result of U.S. led NATO bombing. Indeed, this set of Serbian policies in Kosovo and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia has actually led to a decline in fertility. In 1998 58,000 babies were born in central Serbia, a 15 percent decline since 1990. The population growth rate has fallen in the 1990s from a 1.2 percent annual growth rate to a 1.8 percent decline. (Harden, 1999) . It is unlikely that Germany or Japan, both of which practiced horrid ethnic policies in World War II, gained from these wars. There were 5.6 million Germans and 2.5 million Japanese killed in this war (Ghiglieri, 1999, p. 303, note 217) and both countries suffered extensive physical damage to capital stock from bombs. Both countries are prosperous today, but this prosperity came from trading and exchanging with ethnically heterogeneous neighbors, not from exterminating them. Germany, for example, has large numbers of Turkish workers living in the country. Of course, leaders of countries may still benefit from ethnic conflict, but the policies are probably not in the genetic or economic interest of the citizens of the aggressor countries.
I do not want to overemphasize this factor; many examples of ethnic conflict do not lead to any punishment. But the chance of such punishment is one additional cost that must be considered when contemplating the possibility of ethnic aggression.
SUMMARY
It may be that humans are selected to engage in a certain amount of ethnic conflict. Such conflict would have been fitness improving for the victors (who are our ancestors) in the EEA and so we might have inherited tastes for such conflict. But in today's world, in many circumstances it is unlikely that benefits from such behaviors accrue, even to the victors. While we may have played a zero sum game in the EEA, today a prisoner's dilemma, with gains from cooperation, is a much more valid description of the interaction between ethnic groups. In particular, the possibility of gains from trade indicates that ethnic cooperation is much more likely to increase both wealth and fitness than is ethnic conflict. There are other reasons why such conflict might not pay today. Humans can learn this, as shown by the level of inter-ethnic cooperation in a society such as the U.S., but they must be taught: it may not be a lesson that humans learn on their own. Indeed, even some students of evolution do not fully understand the gains from trade or the costs of ethnic conflict. Nonetheless, if we want to reduce the level of ethnic conflict, reliance on increased gains from trade may be the most effective method. Those who hope that humans will increasingly identify with all humans as relevant in-group may be putting more faith in "balance-of-power" mechanism than is justified. Such mechanisms are limited, in that they operate only when there is also an out-group with whom to compete. On the other hand, gains from trade exhibit no such limits.
